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The Distributional and Cost Implications of Negative Expected Family 
Contributions 
By Robert Kelchen 
Eligibility for many federal, state, and institutional financial aid programs is determined by the 
expected family contribution (EFC) from the Free Application for Federal Student Aid (FAFSA), 
which functions as a tool to ration scarce aid dollars. The lowest possible EFC under current rules 
is zero, but this obscures a wider distribution of family resources that would be partially uncovered 
if the EFC formula were not truncated at zero and negative values were allowed. In this paper, I 
estimate negative EFCs using student-level data from nine colleges and universities between the 
2007-08 and 2011-12 academic year. I find a large amount of dispersion in the distribution of 
negative EFCs for dependent students and that between 20% and 90% of students (varying by 
whether the student files the full FAFSA or qualifies for a Simplified FAFSA or an automatic zero 
EFC) would qualify for a larger Pell Grant award if negative EFCs were allowed. Additional costs of 
funding a negative EFC could range from $1.6 billion to $7.2 billion per year, depending on 
assumptions regarding generosity. 
Keywords: EFC, FAFSA, financial aid 
 
he rising price of attending college and the corresponding increases in student loan debt have 
captured the attention of the higher education community, policymakers, and the public. Although 
real institutional, state, and federal grant aid expenditures have all increased over the last several 
decades (Baum, Ma, Pender, & Bell, 2015), these grants have been unable to keep up with rapid increases in 
the sticker price of college (Ma, Baum, Pender, & Bell, 2015). As a result, the purchasing power of the 
maximum Federal Pell Grant dropped by two thirds (Alsalam, 2013) and now covers less than one third of 
the tuition, fees, and room and board charged to students at public four-year colleges (Goldrick-Rab & 
Kendall, 2014). This contributes to the average debt of bachelor’s degree recipients with student loans 
reaching $29,400 in 2012 (author’s calculations using the National Postsecondary Student Aid Study) and is 
likely a contributing factor behind the persistent gaps in college enrollment and completion rates by family 
income (Bailey & Dynarski, 2011; Kena et al., 2016).  
The federal government developed the first formula to allocate need-based financial aid dollars to 
students in 1972, with the creation of the expected family contribution (EFC) to determine financial need 
for the new Basic Educational Opportunity Grant (now known as the Pell Grant). Wolanin and Gladieux 
(1975, p. 303) noted the difficulty of this endeavor, which still holds true today: “The definition and 
calculation of ‘expected family contribution’ is a problem of almost staggering complexity. It is roughly 
comparable to the determination of federal tax liability.” The Free Application for Federal Student Aid 
(FAFSA), which took its current name and general structure in 1993, is now used to determine the EFC and 
thus eligibility for federal grant aid, work-study funds, and subsidized loans to students from modest  
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financial backgrounds (Gladieux, 1995). The EFC is generated by taking student and parent (if a student is 
dependent) or spouse (if independent) income and assets into account and does not necessarily reflect ability 
to pay. However, it can be a useful proxy for family resources and is thus used by the federal government, 
states, and colleges as a tool to allocate scarce financial aid dollars. 
 
Students whose EFC is below a certain amount ($5,235 for the 2016-17 award year) can qualify for a 
Federal Pell Grant (Federal Student Aid, 2016a), which is the typical proxy used for low-income status. 
Students with the greatest financial need receive an EFC of zero, qualifying them for the maximum Pell 
Grant award of $5,815. In the 2013-14 award year, nearly six million students out of approximately 18 
million FAFSA undergraduate filers received a zero EFC (U.S. Department of Education, 2015). Those who 
receive a zero EFC represent a large and heterogeneous group of students with differing levels of financial 
need. Kelchen (2015) documented the growth in zero EFC students over the past two decades using data 
from the National Postsecondary Student Aid Study, showing that students designated as independent from 
their parents for financial aid purposes and students attending community colleges or for-profit colleges 
were more likely to have a zero EFC than dependent students at four-year public or private nonprofit 
institutions. 
 
Part of the heterogeneity is due to the federal methodology used to calculate the EFC, which artificially 
truncates the distribution of many financial values on the FAFSA. For example, in the 2016-17 award year a 
four-person household with one child in college had their first $27,440 in income exempt from the needs 
analysis through the income protection allowance (Federal Student Aid, 2016b). If that family has few assets 
beyond a home and has less than $27,440 in income, the parent contribution could be negative—but it is 
truncated to zero in the EFC formula. This puts families with no income and families with incomes of 
$25,000 per year in the same zero EFC category, even when their true ability to pay can differ substantially. 
 
As a result, some researchers and advocates have called for the creation of a negative EFC to better 
identify students with the greatest financial need and to target additional financial aid to them. Mortenson 
(1991) called for the creation of a negative EFC more than 20 years ago, noting that students from very low-
income families often have to help support their families while attending college (e.g., Kinsley, 2014). More 
recently, the Center for Law and Social Policy (2013), Goldrick-Rab (2014), Kornfeld & Kantrowitz (2007), 
and McSwain (2008) have all supported allowing for calculating a negative EFC of up to -$750 to direct up 
to $750 in additional funds to the neediest students. Senator Edward Kennedy introduced the Strengthening 
Student Aid for All Act (2008) to incorporate a $750 negative EFC into the federal needs analysis, but it 
never advanced out of committee. The purpose of my study is to examine what a potential change to a $750 





Despite the interest in calculating negative EFCs, no empirical research has examined the distributional 
implications of potential negative-EFC structures or the potential cost implications of a switch to negative 
EFCs. In this study, I examine the potential implications of allowing for negative EFCs, focusing on an 
EFC of -$750 as has been proposed in the past. I used student-level FAFSA data elements on over 150,000 
students from nine colleges and universities to explore the following research questions: 
1. How many students could potentially receive a negative EFC? What would be the typical negative 
EFC values under different model specifications? 
2. What types of students (by FAFSA filing status and dependency status) would be most likely to 
benefit? 
3. What are the potential costs of different negative EFC policies? 
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About the EFC Formula 
 
Students are divided into three categories for the purposes of calculating EFCs, each with a separate EFC 
formula that counts income, allowances, and assets differently. Undergraduate students younger than age 24 
are classified as dependent (for financial aid purposes) unless they are married, are a veteran, have 
dependents of their own, or are legally separated from their parents.1 All other students are classified as 
independent, with students being processed under separate EFC formulas based on whether the student has 
any dependents in his or her family.  
 
For 2016-17, dependent students who filed the FAFSA using their own and their parent(s)’ income 
information, and independent students with their own dependents, receive an automatic zero EFC if two 
criteria are met. First, a household income (i.e., income of the parent(s) if dependent or student/spouse if 
independent) of $25,000 or less in the 2016-17 academic year. Second, meeting additional criteria regarding 
receipt of a means-tested benefit, or being eligible to file the 1040EZ or 1040A tax forms instead of the full 
1040 form (Federal Student Aid, 2016b). These students do not have to provide any additional information 
on the FAFSA to be eligible for the maximum amount of federal financial aid, which greatly simplifies the 
FAFSA completion process and the EFC calculation. (Independent students without dependents are not 
eligible to receive an automatic zero EFC.) 
 
Students from low- to middle-income families can be eligible for a simplified EFC calculation, which 
bypasses the student and parent (for dependent students only) asset components of the FAFSA, if their 
household income is below $50,000 and they either receive means-tested benefits or are eligible to file a 
1040A or 1040EZ. Students who do not qualify for the automatic zero EFC or the simplified FAFSA must 
complete the full FAFSA and provide household asset information. The number of ways students file the 
FAFSA and the resulting data collected on their financial circumstances complicates any potential negative 
EFC calculations. The federal methodology for calculating EFCs currently truncates negative responses to 
zero for three fields in the parent and student EFC calculations: adjusted gross income, investment net 
worth, and business/farm net worth. While income information is available for all students and parents 
regardless of FAFSA filing status, the net worth measures are only available if a student filed the full 
FAFSA. In the Appendix, I further detail the ways a student could potentially receive a negative EFC based 
on these metrics and other family and financial characteristics that influence the federal needs analysis. 
 
 




My primary data source for this study was student-level financial aid data from the 2007-08 through 2011-12 
award years provided to the National Association of Student Financial Aid Administrators (NASFAA) by 
nine of their institutional members. These institutions included two public community colleges, five public 
doctoral-level universities, and two private four-year colleges. The demographic characteristics and 
graduation rates of these institutions can be found in Table 1, along with a comparison, using IPEDS data, 
to other institutions in those sectors. Although I chose the participating institutions due to data availability, 
they appear to be reasonably representative of their broader sectors.2 
                                                          
1 More students were classified as dependent for financial aid purposes before the current definition was adopted in 1992 (Rhind, 
1992). The current rules mean that many students classified as dependent for financial aid purposes file federal tax returns 
independently from their parents, which causes both confusion and consternation.  
2 Based on sample sizes compared to the percentage of students who are Pell-eligible, my dataset likely does not include all 
FAFSA filers from each of the colleges across the five years. I am unable to test for how representative these students are of all 
FAFSA filers at these institutions or to estimate the FAFSA filing rate at each college. 
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Table 1  
 
Summary Characteristics of Institutions in the Student-level Dataset 
 















Two-year publics               
College A 4,200 41 52 23 11 8 71 30 
College B 16,700 14 39 36 15 3 61 18 
Summary 20,900 19 41 33 14 4 63 20 
Sector total 7,160,700 22 43 41 14 15 54 25 
Four-year publics               
College C 31,700 48 44 61 12 64 14 35 
College D 36,300 74 48 92 8 3 75 19 
College E 18,100 61 53 84 2 5 71 22 
College F 23,600 76 57 98 4 3 74 10 
College G 20,800 33 42 64 32 3 48 47 
Summary 130,500 60 48 80 11 18 55 26 
Sector total 6,285,000 54 46 78 12 11 62 26 
Four-year privates               
College H 2,800 72 37 84 4 4 80 26 
College I 3,300 66 38 95 3 3 69 19 
Summary 6,100 69 38 90 3 4 74 22 
Sector total 2,559,000 64 43 83 12 7 62 24 
Source: Integrated Postsecondary Education Data System (IPEDS). 
Note: 
(1) The “summary” and “sector total” rows are weighted by the number of students attending each college. 
(2) The percent Pell figure is for 2008-09; all others are for 2009-10. 





I began with 300,651 observations (214,806 dependent, 48,747 independent without dependents, and 37,098 
independent with dependents) of 153,793 students who were enrolled and filed the FAFSA at least once 
between the 2007-08 and 2011-12 award years.3 To guarantee an accurate negative EFC calculation,4 I then 
restricted the sample to students who had enough FAFSA elements present to calculate an EFC and to 
those for whom I was able to calculate an EFC within $50 of the actual EFC calculated by the U.S. 
Department of Education. These restrictions eliminated 18,721 observations (5.5% of dependent students, 
8.3% of independent students without dependents, and 7.7% of independent students with dependents. My 
analytic sample thus included 281,930 observations across 152,880 students, of whom 68% were initially 
                                                          
3 This excludes approximately 2% of observations that had an EFC changed through a professional judgment, which is used to 
reflect extenuating financial circumstances. 
4 For more details on how EFCs were calculated and verified, see Kelchen & Jones (2015). 
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classified as dependent on their parent(s) for financial aid purposes, 18% were classified as independent 
without any dependents of their own, and 13% were classified as independent students with their own 
dependents.5  
 
In addition to dividing students by dependency status, I divided them by the type of FAFSA filed. 
During this period, dependent students and independent students without dependents could qualify for an 
automatic zero EFC if their adjusted gross income was below $20,000 in 2007-08 and 2008-09, below 
$30,000 in 2009-10 and 2010-11, and below $31,000 in 2011-12 and additional criteria regarding means-
tested benefit receipt or tax filing status were met. Simplified FAFSA filing was available to households with 
income below $50,000 in a given year who also met either the means-tested benefit or tax filing criteria. 
Summary statistics of the student-level sample by dependency status, estimated FAFSA filing status, and 
financial aid award during the first year observed appear in Table 2.6 
 
In my sample of nine institutions, approximately 15% of the 104,044 dependent students qualified for an 
automatic zero EFC. Among dependent students in the sample, automatic zero EFC recipients were 59% 
female, 43% of students were White, and 55% were first-generation students. Average parent and student 
income were just $14,976 and $4,086, respectively, reflecting the tremendous amount of financial need 
present in the families of automatic zero EFC students. Among the 7% of dependent students filing the 
simplified FAFSA, the average parental income was $39,275 per year, about 85% qualified for Pell Grants, 
and 14% received a zero EFC. Finally, the 78% of dependent students who filed the full FAFSA were far 
more likely to be White (78%) and less likely to be first-generation students (25%) or Pell-eligible (22%) 
compared to students with an automatic zero EFC or filing a simplified FAFSA. The average parental 
income of full FAFSA filers was $102,185, and the average EFC was $18,569. 
 
About 76% of the 28,170 students who were classified as independents with no dependents of their own 
filed a simplified FAFSA, as these students are not eligible to receive an automatic zero EFC. This group is 
63% White, 50% female, and 45% first-generation, and their average household income was $11,629. Just 
over 81% of them qualified for a Pell Grant, and 52% received a zero EFC. The rest of the independent 
students completed the full FAFSA and had somewhat stronger financial situations than those who 
completed the simplified FAFSA. But even among this group, average household income was $31,006, 49% 
were Pell-eligible, and 25% had an EFC of zero. 
 
Finally, the group of 20,584 students classified as independent with dependents of their own primarily 
consisted of women from lower-income families. More than 70% of students receiving an automatic zero 
EFC or filing simplified or full FAFSAs were female, and Black students made up at least 30% of each 
group. Over 54% of students with dependents received an automatic zero EFC, having an average family 
income of just $12,393 per year. Nearly all (97%) of the students filing a simplified FAFSA and 63% of 
students filing the full FAFSA qualified for a Pell Grant, and about 30% in both groups received a zero 
EFC. Unlike dependent students filing a full FAFSA with six-figure family incomes, the average income of 




                                                          
5 Just over 1% of students were observed in multiple dependency statuses during this period. The summary statistics presented in 
this paper are for the initial dependency status, while results are presented based on the student’s dependency status during the 
given academic year. 
6 There were no variables that directly indicated a student’s FAFSA filing status within the student-level dataset, but data on each 
of the individual components necessary to qualify for an automatic zero EFC or simplified FAFSA were present in the dataset. 
The estimated filing statuses match up with the amount of data provided; for example, asset information was rarely present for 
students who qualified to file a simplified version of the FAFSA without assets. 
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Table 2 
 
Summary Statistics of the Student-level Sample 
  
Dependent Independent, no dependents 
Independent, 
with dependents 
















Gender (% female) 59.4 57.1 51.2 50.2 56.7 78.9 75.3 72.2 
Race/ethnicity (%) 
        
White 42.5 51.5 77.7 62.9 67.9 45.9 50.5 56.7 
Black 37.2 26.9 8.0 24.7 20.8 43.9 38.1 32.1 
Hispanic 6.6 8.2 3.9 4.2 4.2 4.9 6.0 5.5 
Asian 10.5 10.4 7.6 5.5 4.7 2.8 2.5 3.2 
Parent(s) attended college (%) 45.1 49.8 75.1 54.7 54.7 46.8 45.3 45.2 
Parent income ($) 14,976 39,275 102,185 -- -- -- -- -- 
Student/spouse income ($) 4,086 4,047 4,183 11,629 31,006 12,393 36,477 55,683 
EFC ($) 0 2,421 18,569 2,274 8,252 0 1,263 5,682 
Zero EFC (%) 100.0 13.8 2.2 52.4 25.2 100.0 33.4 26.7 
Pell-eligible (%) 100.0 85.4 21.7 81.2 48.9 100.0 97.0 63.2 
First year in data (%) 
        
2007-08 32.7 44.6 46.0 29.3 32.1 24.3 34.8 31.1 
2008-09 14.8 17.5 14.4 14.9 16.0 13.4 16.5 15.4 
2009-10 17.9 13.3 13.7 17.5 17.0 18.9 21.3 19.8 
2010-11 17.2 13.1 13.2 19.3 17.6 20.7 14.9 18.3 
2011-12 17.4 11.5 12.8 19.0 17.3 22.7 12.5 15.4 
Sample size 15,498 7,585 80,961 21,411 6,759 11,157 3,507 5,920 
Note: 
(1) All data are from the first year a student has an EFC (between 2007-08 and 2011-12). 
(2) “Auto 0 EFC” refers to students with an automatic zero EFC, “Simple FAFSA” refers to students filing a simplified FAFSA, and “full 
FAFSA” refers to students who completed all FAFSA questions. 





I began by calculating EFCs for all students based on their dependency status and estimated FAFSA filing 
status (automatic zero EFC, simplified FAFSA, or full FAFSA) using the EFC formula guides available 
from the U.S. Department of Education for each year between the 2007-08 and 2011-12 academic years. As 
indicated above, any student whose calculated EFC was more than $50 different from their actual EFC was 
dropped from the sample. The calculated EFC is then considered the student’s EFC under current rules to 
prevent any small changes due to differences between actual and calculated EFCs. 
 
A challenge in calculating negative EFCs is that not all possible FAFSA data elements are present for 
students who did not have to complete the full FAFSA. As a result, I had to make assumptions about the 
values of missing elements based on data from the rest of the sample with available data. Household size 
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(missing for 1.1% of the sample) and the number of family members in college (missing for 0.1% of the 
sample) are needed to calculate the income protection allowance for dependent students and independent 
students with dependents, but are not required from students with an automatic zero EFC. I used the most 
common values for these measures among students with data (three people in the household and one in 
college) for both dependency statuses, as these were also the most common values within different 
race/ethnicity, gender and parental education subgroups.  
 
My first specification for calculating negative EFCs was to allow all FAFSA income and asset elements to 
become negative, with the exception of tax allowances, where allowing negative values would result in a 
larger EFC. Parent/student adjusted gross income, parent/student investment net worth, and 
parent/student business and farm net worth are all allowed to be negative, as detailed in the Appendix. 
Students who have positive income and asset values can get negative EFCs if their available income is 
negative after taking income, employment, and/or asset protection allowances into account. Negative 
available income values were not trimmed back to zero. 
 
If asset contributions are allowed to become negative, then students who complete the full FAFSA could 
have negative contributions from their family’s assets (if the asset protection allowance is larger than their 
net assets), while students who complete the simplified FAFSA or qualify for an automatic zero EFC could 
have an asset contribution of zero. To allow all students to fully benefit from allowing asset contributions to 
become negative, I assigned net assets of zero to students with a simplified FAFSA or automatic zero EFC 
while making them eligible for the asset protection allowance. The exact value of the asset allowance varies 
based on parent (if dependent) or student (if independent) age and marital status. While student age and 
marital status were always available in the data, parent age was missing in 17% of observations. I followed 
the U.S. Department of Education’s EFC formula guidelines for how to treat missing ages, substituting age 
45 for any missing values. This could result in some inaccuracies in calculating EFCs compared to when 
ages are available, but the removal of cases in which I was unable to closely match federal EFCs and the 
fairly small contribution of asset protections toward EFCs reduces the magnitude of this data limitation.7 
 
The second specification allowed parent/student adjusted gross income and income-related allowances, 
such as the income protection and employment protection allowances, to become negative, but did not 
allow the asset contribution to be negative. All students with a simplified FAFSA or an automatic zero EFC 
under current rules were automatically assigned an asset contribution of zero, while negative asset 
contributions for students who completed the full FAFSA were trimmed back to zero.  
 
To estimate costs of negative EFCs to the Pell Grant program, I began by limiting negative EFCs to -
$750, which would allow for a maximum Pell Grant of $750 larger than under current program rules.8 This 
matches the majority of policy proposals that have been made to allow negative EFCs by allowing -$750 of 
adjusted available income to be considered in the EFC calculation (Center for Law and Social Policy, 2013; 
Goldrick-Rab, 2014; Kornfeld & Kantrowitz, 2007; McSwain, 2008).This maximum Pell Grant of $6,520 in 
2015-16 would have covered a majority of the tuition at the typical public four-year college (Baum et al., 
2015). But this is still less than half of the total cost of attendance for students attending public colleges and 
universities, as room and board costs, books and supplies, and other living expenses are far larger than 
tuition (Kelchen, Goldrick-Rab, & Hosch, forthcoming).  
 
                                                          
7 For example, in the 2011-12 academic year, married parents with the oldest parent being age 45 received an asset protection 
allowance of $42,900 compared to $64,000 for the oldest parent being age 60. After taking the 12% asset contribution rate and 
22% contribution rate from adjusted available income into account, the difference in EFCs for a low-income family would be 
approximately $557. In the 2016-17 EFC formula (with much lower asset allowances), the difference would be only $219. 
8 For the sake of simplicity, I do not consider implications for the campus-based financial aid programs or federal student loans, 
although increasing Pell awards could have some small effects on other programs. 
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I used the percentage increases in Pell awards under both of my scenarios (one allowing both negative 
income and assets and the other only allowing negative income) to estimate the percentage change in Pell 
expenditures. However, as Pell expenditure data at a national level were not publicly available by both 
dependency status and FAFSA filing type, I had to make a series of assumptions. I used data from the U.S. 
Department of Education (2015) on the number of Pell recipients by dependency status and FAFSA type, in 
conjunction with data on the average Pell award by family income and dependency status.  
 
In order to have the number of Pell recipients by filing status closely match the actual data, I assumed 
that dependent students and independent students with dependents received an automatic zero EFC if their 
household income was below $20,000 for the 2013-14 award year, filed a simplified FAFSA if income was 
between $20,001 and $30,000, or filed a full FAFSA for higher income levels. For independent students 
with no dependents, I assumed that those making less than $20,000 per year filed a simplified FAFSA and 
all others filed a full FAFSA. These categories generally match the most common filing status by family 
income in my data for the 2007-08 and 2008-09 award years, in which the income cutoff for the automatic 
zero EFC ($20,000) was the most similar to the 2013-14 cutoff of $24,000. The only exception is among 
independent students with their own dependents, for which the simplified FAFSA is the most common 
filing status for family incomes between $20,000 and $40,000.9 
 
I was able to estimate the number of Pell recipients in most categories well, although the estimate for 
independent students without dependents filing the full FAFSA was less accurate due to income only being 
reported in $10,000 bands above $20,000 per year. I then multiplied the number of students in each income 
band by dependency status by the average grant in each income band (available in U.S. Department of 
Education data) to estimate current Pell expenditures by FAFSA filing status, which I then multiplied by my 




In addition to the limitations described above regarding how I handled missing FAFSA data elements, the 
greatest limitation to this study is that only nine institutions are represented in the sample, including no for-
profit colleges and only one minority-serving institution. Although the colleges and universities are broadly 
representative of their sectors of higher education (Table 1), they were not intentionally sampled to be a part 
of the dataset used in this study. Rather, I included institutions in the sample if they were willing to provide 
student-level data over a period of several years in order to calculate EFCs. It is unclear whether the 
students attending these institutions differ from those at other colleges on measures other than basic 
demographic characteristics. 
 
It is difficult to determine whether all students with low or even negative family incomes are truly needy, 
or whether some have substantial wealth but negative incomes due to business or investment losses. Prior to 
1993, home and farm equity were a part of the federal need analysis, but were removed in the 1992 
legislation that created the current FAFSA; this made more students with assets eligible to receive federal 
financial aid (Turner, 1997). Although I could not look at these types of assets, I did examine the assets of 
the parents of dependent students who had a negative adjusted gross income (AGI) in at least one year (926 
students or 0.9% of the dependent students in my sample). About half of these parents had investment or 
business equity in the same year they had a negative AGI, and about one fourth had at least $50,000 in 
equity. This suggests that a few students who appeared needy were not, but this group is relatively small in 
proportion to all students who could be affected by a negative EFC. 
 
                                                          
9 A summary table of FAFSA filing statuses by dependency status and household income is available upon request from the 
author. 
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The dataset in this study only includes students who completed the FAFSA. A body of research has 
shown that a substantial percentage of students with great financial need do not file the FAFSA (e.g., 
Kantrowitz, 2015), and that as many as 42% of community college students who would be Pell-eligible if 
they filed the FAFSA do not do so (McKinney & Novak, 2013). As a result, if students are induced to file 
the FAFSA based on increased Pell awards resulting from negative EFCs, the demographic mix of FAFSA 
filers may change in addition to the costs of adopting negative EFCs. Finally, as discussed above, my cost 
estimates should be viewed with caution due to the difficulty of obtaining data on current Pell expenditures 





In this section, I examine the implications of two scenarios that allow for the calculation of negative EFCs 
on the distribution of expected family contributions across FAFSA filing status and dependency status. I 
then turn to how that would affect students’ Pell Grant awards before constructing estimates of how much 
negative EFCs would affect Pell expenditures under different circumstances. 
 
Changes to EFCs 
 
Allowing income and/or asset components on the FAFSA to take negative values results in large decreases 
in EFCs for many students. Table 3 shows summary statistics of the EFC distributions by FAFSA filing 
status (automatic zero EFC, simplified FAFSA, or full FAFSA) across a five-year period between 2007-08 
and 2011-12. For students filing the simplified and full FAFSA, the EFC distributions appear under current 
rules, when only income components are allowed to become negative (“negative income only”), and when 
both income and asset components are allowed to become negative (“negative income and assets”).  
 
The vast majority of students with an automatic zero EFC would receive a negative EFC regardless of 
whether assets are also allowed to become negative. The mean EFC for dependent students would be -
$11,746 if negative assets are included and -$11,729 if they are excluded, compared to EFCs of -$2,978 and -
$2,703 for independent students with dependents. Nearly 94% of dependent students and 88% of 
independent students with dependents would receive an EFC of -$750 with negative assets, with those 
percentages falling slightly to 93% and 81% if assets were not allowed to become negative. This illustrates 
two key findings: 1) allowing assets to become negative does little to change EFCs, and 2) negative EFCs are 
far larger for dependent than for independent students due to the greater number of opportunities for 
negative values to develop across both parents and students compared to through students alone because of 
the larger number of data elements on a dependent student’s FAFSA.10 For example, dependent students 
and their parents can both receive income protection allowances that could lower EFCs, while independent 
students only get an income protection allowance for themselves that tends to be fairly small due to the age 
of independent students compared to parents of dependent students (see the Appendix for more details). 
 
Among students filing the simplified FAFSA, allowing EFCs to become negative did little to increase the 
percentage of students receiving Pell Grants (which was already over 80% across each dependency status). 
When allowing both income and assets to become negative, slightly more than 40% of both dependent 
students and independent students without dependents and 20% of independent students with dependents 
had a negative EFC of at least -$750. Only allowing income to contribute toward the negative EFC 
somewhat reduced the percentage of students receiving EFCs of at least -$750, with the larger decreases 
present for dependent students.  
 
                                                          
10 Graphical depictions of the negative EFC distributions are available upon request from the author. 
Table 3 
EFC Distribution by Year and FAFSA Filing Status 
Automatic zero EFC Completed simplified FAFSA Completed full FAFSA 









EFC under current rules 
Mean EFC ($) 0 0 2,300 2,135 1,085 18,116 8,383 5,449 
EFC of zero (%) 100.0 100.0 15.6 52.6 33.5 2.2 24.8 26.0 
EFC Pell-eligible (%) 100.0 100.0 86.6 80.6 96.9 20.9 47.9 62.4 
EFC with negative income and assets 
Mean EFC ($) -11,746 -2,978 -607 729 529 15,106 7,153 4,562 
EFC at/below -$750 (%) 93.8 88.2 42.9 40.8 20.7 10.2 16.8 21.0 
EFC below zero (%) 95.2 96.0 53.1 47.9 37.4 12.1 21.9 27.3 
EFC Pell-eligible (%) 100.0 100.0 91.8 82.0 97.6 28.1 50.2 64.3 
EFC with negative income only 
Mean EFC ($) -11,279 -2,703 125 1,298 701 15,807 8,032 4,887 
EFC at/below -$750 (%) 92.7 81.3 33.6 35.0 17.9 9.2 12.7 20.0 
EFC below zero (%) 94.2 89.1 37.9 42.8 33.4 10.7 17.8 26.0 
EFC Pell-eligible (%) 100.0 100.0 88.4 80.6 96.9 24.9 47.9 62.4 
Number of observations 29,428 17,534 15,364 33,857 6,213 157,885 10,833 9,930 
Note: 
(1) “Negative income and assets” means all EFC components in the student and parent income and asset portions of the FAFSA are allowed to become negative.
(2) “Negative income only” means all EFC components in the student and parent income portions of the FAFSA are allowed to become negative.
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Turning to students who filed the full FAFSA, the mean EFC across each of the three dependency 
statuses decreased substantially when allowing income and assets to become negative in the federal needs 
analysis. However, many of the changes, particularly among dependent students, were driven by students 
with high EFCs who remained Pell-ineligible. The percentage of Pell-eligible dependent students increased 
from 21% to 28% when including both negative income and assets and to 25% when only including 
negative income. About 10% of dependent students, 17% of independent students without dependents, and 
21% of independent students with dependents would receive an EFC of at least -$750 if both income and 
assets could become negative, with slightly lower percentages if only income were allowed to become 
negative. Most of the students who would receive negative EFCs already had EFCs at or near zero, although 
slightly more dependent students with positive EFCs under current rules would be able to receive negative 
EFCs under my calculations. 
Changes to Student Pell Grant Awards 
Table 4 shows the implications of the two negative EFC estimates on changes to students’ Pell Grant 
awards by dependency status. Nearly all students receiving an automatic zero EFC would see a larger Pell 
award, with allowing assets to become negative alongside income barely affecting the estimates. If only 
income were allowed to count as a negative in the EFC calculation, 93% of dependent students and 82% of 
independent students without dependents would receive a $750 larger Pell Grant than previously allowed. 
Slightly more students would see some increase in Pell without getting the full $750 increase. 
The implications of a negative EFC on the Pell Grants of students filing a simplified FAFSA vary 
significantly by dependency status. Under the more conservative scenario of allowing only income to 
become negative, 65% of dependent students would see an increase in their Pell award of $750 or more, and 
the average increase in Pell would be $919. This is possible because a student could go from an EFC of 
$1,000 to -$750 and thus receive a $1,750 larger Pell Grant than under current rules. Most of this increase is 
driven by students who already receive a Pell Grant, as only 2.6% of dependent students would be newly 
Pell-eligible. Meanwhile, only 36% of independent students without dependents and 19% of independent 
students with dependents would see an increase in Pell of $750 or more and less than half of these students 
would see any increase in Pell awards. Allowing assets to also be counted as negative values increases the 
average Pell award much more for dependent students than independent students, but more than doubles 
the percentage of independent students without dependents who would receive a small increase in their Pell 
award. 
Among students filing the full FAFSA, dependent students would see a larger average Pell increase than 
independent students, which is likely due to dependent students receiving smaller Pell Grants than 
independent students in my data. However, the percentage of students receiving an increase of $750 or 
more to their Pell awards when only income is allowed to become negative is 20% for both dependent 
students and independent students with their own dependents, compared to 13% of independent students 
without dependents. More dependent students would be newly Pell-eligible under my scenarios (7% if 
income and assets were allowed to be negative and 4% under a negative income only calculation) than 
independent students (2% and 0%, respectively). 
Changes to Federal Pell Grant Expenditures 
Finally, I estimated the implications of allowing negative EFCs in the Pell Grant program. Due to both 
increased enrollment as a result of the Great Recession and increased generosity of the Pell program, Pell 
expenditures rose from $14.7 billion in the 2007-08 award year to $35.7 billion in 2010-11 before slowly 
falling to $31.5 billion in 2013-14 (U.S. Department of Education, 2015). I used this most recent value as the 
baseline expenditure level to which I compared my estimates, with the full set of assumptions used in 
generating the estimates presented in Table 5. 
Table 4 
Pell Distributions under Negative EFCs by FAFSA Filing Status and Dependency Status 
Automatic zero EFC Completed simplified FAFSA Completed full FAFSA 









Pell award under current rules 
Mean Pell ($) 5,207 5,228 2,974 3,580 4,020 709 1,965 2,479 
Pell award with negative income and assets 
Pell increase with -$750 EFC cap ($) 709 694 1,313 427 311 438 253 271 
Pell increase of $750 or more (%) 93.9 89.0 77.3 44.6 22.4 24.7 20.9 23.1 
Any increase in Pell (%) 95.2 96.0 91.8 52.8 78.9 27.8 26.9 55.5 
Newly eligible for Pell (%) 0.0 0.0 6.1 1.5 0.4 7.2 2.3 1.9 
Pell award with negative income only 
Pell increase with -$750 EFC cap ($) 701 641 919 292 187 299 114 172 
Pell increase of $750 or more (%) 92.8 82.0 64.5 35.5 18.6 19.7 13.0 20.3 
Any increase in Pell (%) 94.4 89.1 73.8 42.8 33.5 22.3 17.8 26.0 
Newly eligible for Pell (%) 0.0 0.0 2.6 0.0 0.0 4.0 0.0 0.0 
Number of observations 29,428 17,534 15,364 33,857 6,213 157,885 10,833 9,930 
Note: 
(1) “Negative income and assets” means all EFC components in the student and parent income and asset portions of the FAFSA are allowed to become negative.
(2) “Negative income only” means all EFC components in the student and parent income portions of the FAFSA are allowed to become negative.
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Table 5 
 




(a) Percent increase in Pell expenditures by dependency status and FAFSA filing type (from Table 4) 
 
Case 1: Both income and assets allowed to become negative. 
 
 Type of FAFSA 
Filing status Auto zero Simplified Full 
Dependent 13.6 44.1 61.8 
Indep., no dependents N/A 11.9 12.9 
Indep., w/dependents 13.3 7.7 10.9 
 
Case 2: Only income allowed to become negative. 
 
 Type of FAFSA 
Filing status Auto zero Simplified Full 
Dependent 13.5 30.9 42.2 
Indep., no dependents N/A 8.2 5.8 
Indep., w/dependents 12.3 4.7 6.9 
 
(b) Estimates of Pell recipient and award amounts by dependency status and FAFSA filing type (from 2013-14 Pell 
Grant end-of-year report and data from the nine colleges in 2007-08 and 2008-09). 
 
Dependents and independents w/dependents: $0-$20,000 income were assumed to receive auto zero EFC, $20,001-
$30,000 were assigned to simplified FAFSA, and $30,001 and up to full FAFSA. Independents w/no dependents: 
Incomes under $30,000 were assigned to simplified FAFSA, over $30,000 to full FAFSA. 
 
Number of Pell recipients by dependency and FAFSA filing status, 2013-14 (actual) 
 
 Type of FAFSA  
Filing status Auto zero Simplified Full Total 
Dependent 1,497,560 833,529 1,500,303 3,831,392 
Indep., no dependents N/A 1,583,343 319,224 1,902,567 
Indep., w/dependents 1,635,639 607,540 685,515 2,928,694 
 
 
Number of Pell recipients by dependency and FAFSA filing status, 2013-14 (estimated) 
 
 Type of FAFSA  
Filing status Auto zero Simplified Full Total 
Dependent 1,572,314 749,970 1,509,108 3,831,392 
Indep., no dependents N/A 1,737,449 165,118 1,902,567 
Indep., w/dependents 1,584,021 524,261 820,412 2,928,694 
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In Table 6, I present the percentage increase in Pell expenditures by dependency status and FAFSA filing 
type, using the Pell increases from Table 4 divided by the average Pell award. This highlights that dependent 
students would receive the largest percent increase in Pell award dollars under either negative EFC scenario, 
while independent students would see much smaller increases. For example, independent students without 
dependents who filed a simplified FAFSA would only see a 4.7% increase in Pell award dollars if only 
income were allowed to become negative and a 7.7% increase if income and assets could both be negative. 
This compares to 42.2% and 61.8% increases for dependent students filing the full FAFSA. Multiplying 
these percentage increases by my estimates of 2013-14 national Pell expenditures by dependency status and 





Cost Estimates to the Federal Pell Grant Program of Different Negative EFC Scenarios 
 
Estimated Pell expenditures by dependency and filing status, 2013-14 ($1,000s) 
 
 Type of FAFSA  
Filing status Auto zero Simplified Full Total 
Dependent 6,994,000 3,339,000 4,527,000 14,860,000 
Indep., no dependents N/A 6,212,000 236,600 6,448,600 
Indep., w/dependents 5,738,000 1,921,000 2,498,000 10,157,000 
Total 12,732,000 11,472,000 7,261,600 31,465,600 
 
Case 1: Both income and assets allowed to become negative ($1,000s). 
 
 Type of FAFSA   
Filing status Auto zero Simplified Full Total % increase 
Dependent 7,946,323 4,813,145 7,323,652 20,083,120 35.1% 
Indep., no dependents N/A 6,952,928 266,386 7,219,314 12.0% 
Indep., w/dependents 6,499,701 2,069,615 2,771,077 11,340,393 11.7% 
Total 14,446,024 13,835,688 10,361,114 38,642,826 22.8% 
Percent increase 13.5% 20.6% 42.7% 22.8%  
 
Case 2: Only income allowed to become negative ($1,000s). 
 
 Type of FAFSA   
Filing status Auto zero Simplified Full Total % increase 
Dependent 7,935,577 4,370,789 6,436,130 18,742,496 26.1% 
Indep., no dependents N/A 6,718,677 249,692 6,968,369 8.1% 
Indep., w/dependents 6,441,531 2,010,360 2,671,318 11,123,209 9.5% 
Total 14,377,108 13,099,826 9,357,140 36,834,074 17.1% 
Percent increase 12.9% 14.2% 28.9% 17.1%   
Sources: Federal Pell Grant end-of-year reports, author’s data from Table 4. 
(1) Independent students without dependents of their own are not eligible to receive an automatic zero EFC. 
(2) The number of Pell recipients and expenditures by dependency status and FAFSA filing status had to be estimated due to insufficient data 
being publicly available on Federal Student Aid’s website. 
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Under the less conservative set of estimates that allow both income and assets to become negative in the 
federal needs analysis, I estimate that overall Pell expenditures would increase from $31.5 billion per year to 
$38.6 billion per year—a 22.8% increase in federal spending. Students receiving an automatic zero EFC 
would see a 13.5% increase in Pell award dollars, or about $1.7 billion per year, while students filing the full 
FAFSA would see a $3.1 billion increase in award dollars (42.7%). Independent students would get about 
12% more in Pell dollars (a total of about $1.9 billion per year), and dependent students would receive an 
additional 35.1% (or $5.2 billion per year). Only allowing income to factor into negative EFC calculations 
would bring total Pell expenditures up to $36.8 billion, up 17.1% from current rules but $1.8 billion below 
the cost of allowing assets to become negative. The cost estimates for automatic zero EFC students would 
change very slightly compared to when negative asset values were allowed, with much smaller program cost 
increases for students filing the full FAFSA, as well as for dependent students.  
 
Under an alternative (and more likely) scenario in, which any changes to the EFC formula are devised so 
they are roughly budget-neutral, dependent students filing the simplified or full FAFSA would gain 
additional Pell funds while independent students would lose Pell dollars. Even assuming a 10% increase in 
Pell expenditures (to $34.6 billion) and scaling the percentage gains from each dependency status/FAFSA 
filing type cell to fit the budget constraint, nearly all of the gains go to dependent students. In the model 
with negative income and assets, dependent students would get 99.4% of the additional $3.1 billion, 
independent students without dependents get 0.6%, and independent students with dependents would get 
0.02% more funds.11 If only income were allowed to be negative, dependent students would get 87.5% of 
the additional funds while independent students without and with dependents would get 3.2% and 9.4% of 





The current federal methodology for determining EFCs allows for a minimum EFC value of zero. Although 
EFCs currently function more as a rationing tool for financial aid than a true measure of a family’s ability to 
pay for college, allowing EFCs to become negative would better reflect the relative ranking of families’ 
ability to pay. The artificial truncation of the current distribution lumps together families with substantial 
financial need, but students with a zero EFC are heterogeneous across many different dimensions (e.g., 
Kelchen, 2015). Although Congress has recently considered efforts to simplify the FAFSA to a small 
number of questions, the number of data elements currently available allows for more nuanced rankings of 
students’ financial need. 
 
In this paper, I show that a large percentage of students who currently qualify for Pell Grants would have 
a negative EFC if income elements on the FAFSA were not truncated at zero and instead could become 
negative. Allowing asset elements to contribute toward negative EFCs also has an effect on the percentage 
of students who could receive negative EFCs, but the negative asset contribution is far outweighed by the 
negative contribution from income components for the vast majority of students. More than 80% of 
students receiving an automatic zero EFC, 30% of students filing a simplified FAFSA, and 15% of students 
filing a full FAFSA would see a larger Pell Grant if negative EFCs were allowed.  
 
Across FAFSA filing types, the largest gains in Pell Grant awards under negative EFCs were for 
dependent students. Pell award increases were three times as large for dependent students as for 
independent students, suggesting that traditional-age students would benefit the most from a switch to 
negative EFCs unless the allocation formula was changed differently for different types of students. If 
negative EFC formula charts are adopted and made available to financial aid administrators, they may want 
                                                          
11 A table showing the gains in this scenario is available upon request from the author. 
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to consider using negative EFCs to rank students’ financial need only within their dependency status and 
FAFSA filing type. This would prevent, for example, dependent students filing the full FAFSA from 
receiving a disproportionate amount of institutional grant aid due to their ability to have a larger negative 
EFC because of the number of data elements that can potentially become negative. But this also raises 
fundamental concerns about the current federal needs analysis methodology and whether equal EFCs across 
dependency statuses should be considered equal for the purposes of allocating scarce institutional aid 
dollars. 
 
Funding even a modest negative EFC would have significant implications for the Pell program’s budget 
(an increase of about 20% over current spending levels), so full adoption of a $750 EFC for all students is 
likely infeasible at this time. As a first step, it would be logical to fund negative EFCs only for students who 
currently have an automatic zero EFC—reflecting an estimate of the greatest amount of financial need. For 
example, 63% of dependent students and 69% of independent students without dependents who received 
an automatic zero EFC in 2013-14 had family incomes below $15,000 per year compared to just 17% of 
dependent students and 13% of independent students with dependents with a calculated zero EFC (U.S. 
Department of Education, 2015). If only income were allowed to become negative for automatic zero EFC 
students, estimated Pell awards would have increased by about $1.6 billion in 2013-14 to $33.1 billion, which 
is less than program expenditures in the early 2010s. Adjusted gross incomes are not perfect measures of a 
family’s ability to pay, but this stark difference in family incomes may suggest targeting resources to 
automatic zero EFC students. If negative EFCs were adopted, they should also be extended to the neediest 
independent students without dependents, as they are not currently eligible for an automatic zero EFC.  
 
In the short run, the U.S. Department of Education could take a positive step at no additional cost to the 
federal government by calculating negative EFCs for all students and notifying students and colleges of 
those values, but funding the Pell Grant program and other financial aid programs in the same manner as 
today by using the current EFC for aid allocation purposes. Even in the long run, fully meeting negative 
EFCs beyond a -$750 threshold appears quite unlikely. This means that although the federal government 
will be able to better discern relative need for students with EFCs between zero and -$750, students with 
EFCs truncated to -$750 will still be grouped together. This is an imperfect metric, but it would help the 
federal government target funds to at least a somewhat smaller number of students with the greatest 
financial need. 
 
Calculating both full and truncated negative EFCs and disseminating these values to colleges and states 
would help these other entities distribute their aid in a more informed manner, and colleges could work to 
do this immediately without the federal government calculating negative EFCs for the Pell program. For 
example, as funds for the campus-based financial aid programs (i.e., Federal Supplemental Educational 
Opportunity Grant and Federal Work-Study) have failed to keep up with student enrollment growth and are 
disproportionately awarded to colleges with smaller percentages of Pell recipients (Kelchen, forthcoming), 
financial aid administrators at colleges with larger percentages of Pell recipients may want to target these 
funds to students with the largest negative EFCs instead of spreading the funds around to all zero-EFC 
students. However, a more precise picture of students’ ability to pay may result in some colleges declining to 
fund or enroll students with the greatest financial need due to legitimate ethical concerns (not wanting 
students to take on too much debt) or concerns about what properly funding such students might mean for 
the overall institutional aid budget. 
 
If a large increase in Pell dollars does become a reality, the federal government needs to be mindful that 
other agents in the college funding picture might reduce their effort in response to additional federal funds. 
For example, a body of research has found that some colleges, particularly those with higher sticker prices, 
have been able to capture some of the additional Pell revenue resulting from recent increases to the 
maximum award (Lau, 2014; Lucca, Nadauld, & Shen, 2015; Turner, 2014). Additionally, Delaney (2014) 
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found that states cut back their own grant aid programs (but not appropriations) after the federal 
government gave states economic stimulus funds that required that the state maintain a certain level of 
appropriations but not grant aid funding. It remains to be seen whether colleges or states would behave in 
the same way if Pell funds were increased only for students with the greatest financial need. In theory, it is 
even possible that a large enough Pell award for the neediest students might encourage colleges to enroll 
more of these students. 
 
As the findings in this paper are based on a sample from nine colleges of students who were enrolled in 
college at least five years ago, it is important to replicate this research before proposing a complete overhaul 
of the federal needs analysis. Future researchers should use newer, nationally-representative data to estimate 
the implications of negative EFCs, and would ideally be able to convince the U.S. Department of Education 
to use their “experimental sites” authority to pilot a negative EFC program. It is also important to think 
more about budget-neutral ways to target funds to the neediest students in future work and the implications 
for middle-income families. Some potential extensions of this work include the implications of reducing 
eligibility for middle-income families, better coordinating institutional, state, and federal aid programs for 
the lowest-income students, or reducing allowances against income and assets to further delineate students 
by ability to pay. Finally, future research should consider how various proposals to simplify the FAFSA 
would affect the distribution of negative EFCs, particularly if detailed asset questions are no longer included 
in the federal needs analysis. 
 
 
Nexus: Connecting Research to Practice 
• Negative EFCs should be calculated to help institutions and states better target their scarce 
financial aid dollars to students with the greatest financial need. If the federal government 
does not calculate negative EFCs, financial aid professionals should consider calculating 
them as a way to target funds. 
• Since different amounts of income and asset data are available across different dependency 
statuses and FAFSA filing types, negative EFCs will have different meanings of financial 
strength across different types of students. Financial aid professionals should use EFCs to 
rank student need only within a dependency status/FAFSA filing type combination (such 
as dependent students filing simplified FAFSAs). 
• Both the federal government and colleges should focus giving any additional grant aid 
dollars to students who currently qualify for an automatic zero EFC based on their 
negative EFC. However, procedures should be put in place to allow the neediest 
independent students without dependents (who do not currently qualify for an automatic 
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Appendix: Three Ways to Get a Negative EFC 
 
Due to the complexity of the federal needs analysis formula, a student’s EFC can be influenced by a number 
of financial and family characteristics. Appendix Table A shows the three main ways a student can end up 
with a negative EFC under the existing formula before that EFC is then trimmed back to zero. This 
information is based on the 2016-17 Federal Methodology formula. 
 
The first way a student could receive a negative EFC is to have negative values for adjusted gross 
income, investment net worth, or business/farm net worth. Adjusted gross income is available for all 
FAFSA filers, while only students filing the full FAFSA would have values for the other two elements.  
 
The second way a student could receive a negative EFC is through a set of allowances designed to 
protect income and/or assets. Parents of dependent students filing either the simplified or full FAFSA 
received an income protection allowance of at least $17,840 in the 2016-17 award year based on household 
size and the number of family members in college. The formula exempted $6,400 from dependent students’ 
contribution; either $9,960 or $15,960 for independent students without dependents; and at least $20,900 for 
independent students with dependents. Independent students and parents of dependent students filing 
either the simplified or full FAFSA could qualify for an employment expense allowance of up to $4,000. 
Finally, independent students and parents of dependent students who filed the full FAFSA received an asset 
protection allowance of up to $29,600 depending on their age and marital status.  
 
The third way a student could receive a negative EFC is through the assessment rates for nonprotected 
income (simplified and full FAFSA) and assets (full FAFSA only). Independent students with dependents 
were expected to contribute 7% of assets in 2016-17, while parents of dependent students were expected to 
contribute 12% of assets. Dependent students and independent students without dependents were expected 
to contribute 20% of their assets in addition to half of their income after taking allowances into account; the 
income and asset contributions are added together and truncated at zero to get their contribution toward the 
EFC. Parents and independent students with dependents must contribute a certain percentage of adjusted 
available income (AAI; the asset contribution, where applicable, plus income less any allowances) to 
calculate their contributions toward EFC. If the AAI was below -$3,409, the 2016-17 formula would 
truncate it at -$750, which is likely the reason most calls for negative EFCs have focused on -$750. For 
AAIs greater than -$3,409, the marginal contribution rate gradually increased from 22% to 47%. Finally, the 
student and parent EFCs are then added together for dependent students and all EFCs are divided by the 
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Appendix Table A  
 
EFC Formula Elements that Could Result in Negative EFCs 
 
EFC element Dependency status(es) Filing status(es) Notes 
Negative values trimmed to zero 
   
Adjusted gross income All All 
 
Investment net worth All Full FAFSA 
 
Business/farm net worth All Full FAFSA 
 
Allowances not tied to tax rates 
   
Parent income protection Dependent Simplified, full $17,440 to $30,000+ exempted based on household size and number in college 
Student income protection Dependent Simplified, full Fixed $6,260  
Student income protection Independent, no dependents Simplified, full 
$9,730/$15,600 exempted based on 
marital status, household size, and 
number in college 
Student income protection Independent w/dependents Simplified, full 
$24,650 to $50,000+ exempted based on 
household size and number in college 
Parent employment expense Dependent Simplified, full Up to $4,000 of income exempted 
Student employment expense Independent Simplified, full Up to $4,000 of income exempted 
Parent asset protection Dependent Full FAFSA $0 to $52,600 based on age and marital status 
Student asset protection Independent Full FAFSA $0 to $52,600 based on age and marital status 
Asset and available income assessment rates 
  
Parent asset assessment rate Dependent Full FAFSA Fixed 12% of assets not exempted 
Student asset assessment rate Dependent Full FAFSA Fixed 20% of assets--no exemptions 
Student asset assessment rate Independent, no dependents Full FAFSA Fixed 7% of assets not exempted 
Student asset assessment rate Independent w/dependents Full FAFSA Fixed 20% of assets not exempted 
Parent AAI assessment rate Dependent Simplified, full 22%-47% of net income and asset contributions 
Student AI assessment rate Dependent, indep. w/o dependents Simplified, full Fixed 50% of income less allowances 
Student AAI assessment rate Independent w/dependents Simplified, full 
22%-47% of net income and asset 
contributions 
Note:  
AAI is adjusted available income and AI is available income. 
Source: EFC Formula Guide, 2014-15 (Federal Student Aid, 2013) 
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